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1 Examining the illusion of accountability
Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson and
Thomas Persson
Accountability features as an important – perhaps the most important –theme
in the ongoing debate on the EU’s democratic deficit (Curtin and Wille 2008).
This seems only natural, since accountability is necessary if representative
democracy is to work. Representatives must, if they are to fulfil their duties in
an effective manner, be accorded independent powers to act. On the other
hand, they must not forget those whom they represent.
With the use of open mandates, there will always be a need for institutional
arrangements which force representatives to be responsive to the wishes of
those they represent (Pitkin 1967: 233). Representative democracy is about
the controlled transmission of power (Sartori 1987: 232–4). If there is to be
any guarantee that representatives actually work to promote the interests of
citizens, the latter must be able to hold the former accountable for their
actions. Thus, representative political systems which lack mechanisms for
holding decision-makers effectively accountable are seriously flawed from a
democratic standpoint.
Do EU citizens have real opportunities to hold decision-makers accoun-
table, or does the current institutional set-up in the Union merely create an
illusion of accountability? That is the central question of this volume. There
are widespread and growing concerns that the political system of the EU does
not, in fact, afford citizens appropriate mechanisms of accountability
(Schmitter 2000; Harlow 2002; Arnull and Wincott 2002; Fischer 2004;
Bovens 2007a). The aim of the current study is to ascertain whether such
concerns are warranted.
We thereby connect up with the ongoing debate on the EU’s democratic
deficit, which has been with us for almost two decades now. Concerns over
accountability are an integral part of this overarching discussion on the
Union’s democratic credentials. Is a democratisation of the EU necessary? Is
it desirable? Is there, in fact, any problem that really needs addressing here?
And if there is, can it be remedied? As we understand it, there are three main
positions in this huge debate:
According to the first, there is no democratic problem at the European level
(Moravcsik 2002, 2008; Majone 2005). The EU works wonderfully, and the
only problem is the tendency of European intellectuals and even some politi-
cians to fuel the notion that the EU is plagued by a democratic deficit.
Proponents of the second position argue that there is indeed a democratic
problem, and that it can and should be addressed. The solution is to intro-
duce more political competition at the European level, thus establishing
‘limited democratic politics’ in the European Union (Føllesdal and Hix 2006;
Hix 2008).
Advocates of the third position concede there is a democratic deficit, but
they believe we should proceed with extreme care when deciding how or
whether to address it. They warn us that the cure may turn out to be worse
than the disease (Bartolini 2006, 2008; Scharpf 2008, 2009).
Taking a step back, we might ask why questions of democracy and
accountability are relevant in the context of the European Union. Is not the
EU, after all, just an international organisation among others, to which
member states have delegated tasks which they believe are more efficiently
handled at the international level? Why is there so much fuss about the EU’s
democratic deficit? True enough, scholars are now beginning to analyse and
question the democratic status not only of the EU but of other international
organisations as well (e.g. Zweifel 2006). However, the demands placed on the
EU when it comes to meeting democratic criteria are far heavier than on any
other international organisation. How come?
We believe that the EU (and its member states) has partly itself to blame
that the debate over its democratic shortcomings has become so heated.
While formally an international organisation, namely, the EU has gradually
acquired an institutional structure and set of competencies that had pre-
viously been reserved for nation-states. In its current form, the EU is an
extremely influential organisation, with the power to make collective decisions
which are binding on all residents of its member states. When a decision-
making body is that powerful, concerns over democracy and legitimacy are
only natural and appropriate.
Furthermore, the EU has partly responded to the demands for democrati-
sation that have been placed upon it. Through a series of treaty reforms over
time, it has developed an institutional set-up bearing a reasonable resem-
blance to a democratic political system. At the international level, that makes
the EU unique, as the only site today of governance beyond the nation-state
where ‘the incipient institutions of a “democratic” transnational political
community are faintly visible’ (Dahl 1994: 32). This has served to encourage
the idea that a ‘third transformation’ (Dahl 1989: 309–21) in the history of
democratic practice may be possible.
A third transformation?
Towards the end of Democracy and Its Critics, Robert Dahl raises the ques-
tion of whether the scale of politics can remain coterminous over the long
term with the scale of economics, law, and culture. Thus far we have
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witnessed two democratic transformations: The first took place in ancient
Greece, and led to the establishment of the democratic city-state. Government
by the few was replaced by government by the many. The second transforma-
tion involved the replacement of direct forms of democracy with representative
forms. The democratic process could then be applied at the level of the nation-
state, rather than being reserved for political systems the size of a city-state.
The question now is whether a third transformation, establishing democratic
governance beyond the nation-state, is in the cards (Dahl 1989: 312).
Dahl’s own answer to this question is to urge his readers to be cautious. In
his earlier work, Dahl seemed fairly optimistic about the possibilities for a
third transformation, pointing out the EU as the most likely contender to
meet the challenge of establishing democratic governance at the international
level (Dahl 1989: 320). More recently, however, he seems to have become
more sceptical of the possibility of democratising international organisations
and achieving a third transformation (Dahl 1998: 117; Dahl 1999: 32–4).
At a more general level, furthermore, Dahl reminds us of the obstacles we
always face when we try to translate visions into practice. He urges us to hold
on to our sound practical judgement, and to recall the discrepancy between
the ideal and the real.
Measured against its exacting ideal, the imperfections of any actual
democracy are so obvious and so enourmous that the palpable dis-
crepancy between ideal and reality constantly stimulates unbounded
hopes that the ideal may somehow be made real. But feasible solutions
often prove elusive, and those who so easily construct an ideal democ-
racy in their imaginations soon discover that it is far harder, or even
impossible, to construct that ideal in the real world.
(Dahl 1989: 312)
In the case of the EU, the discrepancy between democratic ideals and prac-
tices has been quite apparent, and it has given rise – as Dahl predicted – to
numerous proposals on how to address the democratic shortcomings of that
body (e.g. Abromeit 1998; Eriksen 2000; Føllesdal and Hix 2006; Schmalz-
Bruns 2007; Hix 2008). It is also possible to point to a number of reforms –
the introduction and gradual extension of co-decision, the adoption of reg-
ulation 1049/2001 on public access to documents, and the increased role of
the EP in the appointment of a new Commission – that have served to close,
at least in some degree, the gap between the ideal and the real, moving EU
governance in a more democratic direction (Karlsson 2001: 44–103).
How should these attempts at remedying the democratic deficiencies of the
EU be understood? Has the EU succeeded with the third transformation, at
least in part? Or have these reforms only created a false image of a democratic
political system in which citizens are able to hold decision-makers to account?
We would not, of course, expect the EU to meet the criteria of an ideal
democracy fully. For the story of democracy’s transformations – as Norberto
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Bobbio reminds us in The Future of Democracy – shows that there will always
be a gap between the ideal and the real, ‘between what was promised and what
has actually come about’ (Bobbio 1987: 27). According to Bobbio, real-world
democracies have failed to keep the promises inherent in democratic ideals. But
the reason, he argues, why these broken promises (Bobbio 1987: 27–39) were not
kept is that ‘the project of political democracy was conceived for a society much
less complex than the one that exists today’ (Bobbio 1987: 37). It is therefore
impossible for real-world democracies to meet their ideals fully. The question
we should rather ask ourselves, as we set out to examine existing political systems,
is to what degree they manage to meet the criteria of a fully democratic process.
An illusion of accountability?
We make no attempt, in the current study, to accomplish the monumental
task of assessing whether the EU meets all of the criteria that constitute the
democratic ideal. Instead, we focus exclusively on what opportunities citizens
have for holding decision-makers accountable.
We believe the topic selected for this volume is a timely one, in view of the
increased interest in questions of accountability in an EU context. Our choice
is also justified by the fact that accountability, as argued above, is of vital
importance for any representative political system that aspires to be even
minimally democratic.
By accountability, we have in mind a relationship between two actors (X
and Y) wherein X has the right to: (1) monitor the actions of Y, (2) evaluate
the actions of Y, and (3) impose sanctions on Y (cf. Grant and Keohane 2005:
29; Bovens 2007a: 450–1).
Our concern here is with what is sometimes called ‘internal accountability’: i.e.
a relationship whereby X has delegated authority to Y (who may in turn have
delegated authority to Z). Some scholars also speak of ‘external account-
ability’, whereby actors are held to account by all those who are affected by their
actions, rather than by those who have delegated power to them (cf. Keohane’s
contribution in this volume). Our understanding of accountability, however,
presupposes an act of delegation. An accountability relationship between two
actors can therefore be described in principal-agent terms (Strøm et al. 2004).
In the context of the EU, it is the citizens of the Union who are the ulti-
mate principals. It is they who have delegated power to parliaments and
governments. The latter in turn have empowered EU institutions and civil
servants to carry out the day-to-day business of EU affairs. A chain of dele-
gation often has more than two links, with actors in the middle playing the
role of both agent and principal. Member-state governments, for example, are
the agents of EU citizens and act as their representatives in Brussels. Yet they
are also principals, for they delegate their own authority to civil servants.
Principals may have a number of mechanisms at their disposal for ensuring
that their agents act in accordance with the mandate given them. Such mechan-
isms operate in an ex post manner: they involve monitoring, evaluating, and
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sanctioning after the fact. However, the impact of accountability may also be
apparent ex ante, ‘since the anticipation of sanctions may deter the powerful
from abusing their positions in the first place’ (Grant and Keohane 2005: 30).
A number of different accountability mechanisms are available in different
contexts, including electoral contests, legal requirements, and fiscal instru-
ments. These various mechanisms can be placed on a continuum from weak
to strong. At the weak end, we find tools that merely allow for monitoring an
agent’s actions: e.g. the right to access documents. Then, moving along the
continuum towards the other end, we find instruments that also permit prin-
cipals to evaluate the actions of representatives: e.g. the right to call hearings.
At the strong end of the spectrum, finally, we find mechanisms that make it
possible to impose sanctions on the agent: e.g. the right of superiors to
remove employees, of parliaments to call a vote of confidence, and of voters
to change government on Election Day.
What sets the EU apart from other international organisations is that it
offers an institutional setting that seems, on the surface, to allow the public
actually to hold decision-makers accountable: indirectly through their
national governments, and directly through the European Parliament. It is
important to distinguish, however, between formal accountability mechanisms
and any real opportunities principals may have to hold agents accountable.
Consider direct accountability via the European Parliament. MEPs are
directly elected by EU citizens, so there is a strong mechanism for account-
ability here: should EU citizens feel that ‘their’ MEPs have done a bad job,
they can simply not vote for them at the next EP election. However, the real
opportunities for citizens to hold MEPs accountable are sharply limited by
the fact that EP elections are second-order national contests fought out on
domestic rather than European issues (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix 2008). The
absence of electoral contests fought on European issues undermines the abil-
ity of citizens to hold MEPs accountable for their actions, notwithstanding
the existence of a strong accountability mechanism.
It is important to ascertain, then, whether the accountability mechanisms
at the disposal of EU citizens are weak or strong. However, it is also neces-
sary to know whether these powers are merely formal, or whether instead
they provide real opportunities to hold decision-makers to account.
There are those, then, who are genuinely concerned that the political
system of the EU does not afford citizens sufficient opportunities to hold
decision-makers to account. But there are also those who deny there is any
accountability deficit at all, or that the current system lacks adequate
mechanisms for accountability (Moravscik 2002: 611–2). In the current
debate on the democratic status of the EU, we can identify five arguments
supporting the conclusion that there are indeed sufficient means for holding
decision-makers to account in the Union. Taken together, these arguments
paint a picture of the EU as a site for governance in which the third trans-
formation (to democracy beyond the nation-state) has partly succeeded – at
least when it comes to meeting reasonable criteria for accountability.
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In this volume, we shall examine these five arguments in order to determine
whether the image of the EU as offering sufficient accountability is justified,
or whether the current institutional set-up and practice of decision-making is
one that merely creates an illusion of accountability. It may well be that denials
of an accountability deficit in the Union are based on a misapprehension of
the true state of affairs.
Five arguments that EU accountability is sufficient
These five arguments, which claim there is no accountability deficit and that
current arrangements are therefore satisfactory, will be examined under the
following headings: ‘rethink the meaning of accountability’; ‘delegated powers
and accountability’; ‘hold the legislature accountable’; ‘hold the executive
accountable’; and ‘accountability through civil society’.
Rethink the meaning of accountability
According to the first argument, we should rethink what it means to hold
decision-makers to account. Where the EU is concerned, we should ‘look for
new standards of legitimacy and accountability’ (Majone 1998: 18). We
should not necessarily require that its political system provide citizens with
strong mechanisms of accountability; rather, we ought to content ourselves
with reforms designed to improve transparency, and we should require of
decisions-makers that they give reasons for their actions (Majone 1998: 20–2).
In Chapter 2, ‘Accountability in world politics’, Robert Keohane notes that
the lack of global democracy has become an important public issue, as inter-
dependence and globalisation have increased the need for global governance.
The problem is that the conditions for electoral democracy – much less par-
ticipatory democracy – are not present on the global level. Rather than
abandoning democratic principles, however, we should rethink our ambitions
and look for feasible ways to strengthen mechanisms of accountability in
world politics. If we are to succeed in this mission, we will need to abandon
the belief that all forms of accountability require popular elections in order to
be meaningful.
In Chapter 3, ‘Accountability and democracy’, Heidrun Abromeit criticises
the notion that existing mechanisms of accountability can be taken – even
when they seem to be working well enough – as a surrogate for democracy.
She stresses that the view that accountability and democracy are identical
involves a fair amount of concept-stretching. Rather than rethinking the
meaning of accountability and democracy in the context of international
politics, she argues, we should acknowledge that what is needed for true
democratic accountability in the Union is a mixture of electoral and direct-
democratic elements.
In Chapter 4, ‘Putting limits on accountability avoidance’, Sverker Gus-
tavsson asks whether light can be shed on the basic problem if we approach
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the issue from the other end: i.e. if we explore different strategies for avoiding
rather than promoting accountability. The question put in his chapter is: what
are the limits of accountability avoidance? We are impelled to put a limit on
the evasion of responsibility, he argues, by the need to maintain a role for
legitimate opposition. For not even the most ardent believers in consensus
and expert rule are completely insensitive to the risk of a constitutional
breakdown. In societies with universal suffrage and political freedom, it is
very risky to allow opposition to wane, or to let it take the form of principled
and fundamental negativism.
Delegated power and accountability
According to the second argument, the accountability deficit is a matter of
limited concern, because the member states have the power to retrieve all
delegated competencies. This argument rests on the premise that authority
has only been delegated – not alienated – to the Union. It is national politi-
cians who have the final say over what competencies are to be delegated to the
EU, or retrieved from it – and these decision-makers are indeed subject to
strong accountability mechanisms in the member states. Since member states
can retrieve delegated competencies by reforming the treaties, it is no more
difficult to justify delegation to the EU than to justify delegation to domestic
regulatory agencies (Kahler 2004: 135; Moravscik 2004: 356).
In Chapter 5, ‘Irretrievable powers and democratic accountability’, Hans
Agné examines the widely held view that democratic states are able to retrieve
powers they have delegated to international organisations like the EU. This
capacity is cited in justification of the limited nature of present opportunities
to hold international decision-makers accountable. Agné challenges this argu-
ment, by showing that the authority exercised by organisations like the EU is
virtually impossible to restore to member states. He then explores the impli-
cations of the irrevocability of international powers for the meaning and
normative standing of accountability. He argues that the trend whereby more
and more competencies are delegated to the European level has resulted in a
weaker kind of accountability. Rather than trying to obfuscate this reality by
conflating what are fundamentally different concepts of delegation, scholars
should help to raise awareness of what is at stake here: namely, how our
ability to hold decision-makers accountable is affected when we delegate
powers to international organisations like the EU.
In Chapter 6, ‘EU treaty reform and accountability’, Christer Karlsson
asks whether EU citizens have any meaningful influence over the most fun-
damental decisions taken in the Union: namely, those that lay down the rules
of the game. He shows that the opportunities enjoyed by EU citizens to hold
treaty reformers accountable are in fact limited. Moreover, the convention
method introduced by the Laeken European Council improves the situation
only marginally. The fundamental problem is that neither national nor EP
elections are contests over issues relating to the future design of European
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integration; nor are voters ever presented with alternative views on the issues
decided at Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). In practice, therefore, EU
citizens have no effective means of sanctioning those responsible for deciding
on new treaties.
Hold the legislature accountable
According to proponents of the third argument, the EU has developed an
institutional structure that furnishes EU citizens with two effective mechan-
isms for holding those responsible for legislative decision-making in the
Union to account: namely, ‘direct accountability via the EP and indirect
accountability via elected national officials’ (Moravscik 2002: 611).
As we saw above, however, the strong mechanism for accountability via
directly elected MEPs is problematic in practice, due to the fact that EP
elections are not fought on European issues. Extensive research has been
devoted in recent years to the role of the EP in EU legislation, and to the
ability of EU citizens to hold MEPs accountable through elections to that
body (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2007). We prefer, therefore, to focus our attentions
in this study on two areas relating to legislative accountability that have been
researched far less.
First, in Chapter 7, ‘Delegation to the permanent representation and
mechanisms of accountability’, Thomas Larue analyses and compares the
delegation and accountability designs established by national governments in
Sweden and France vis-à-vis their respective permanent representations in
Brussels. This link is crucial for understanding and evaluating the opportunities
open to national citizens to hold the Council of Ministers indirectly accoun-
table for EU legislation. Larue argues that national bureaucrats stationed in
Brussels are indeed cornerstones of our democracies, yet there are no effective
mechanisms at present for holding them accountable. Back-pedalling along
the chain of delegation is extremely costly, if not downright impossible –
because revoking a national standpoint entails a severe loss of credibility.
Thus we have a situation where accountability is a de jure possibility, but a
de facto chimera.
In Chapter 8, ‘European intelligence cooperation and accountability’,
Thorsten Wetzling seeks to shed light on accountability in relation to intelli-
gence activities, an area increasingly characterised by European cooperation.
Intelligence still figures as one of the least transparent fields; it therefore
serves as a critical case for accountability in the EU. Wetzling asks what the
effect is on accountability when intelligence moves to the European level. He
shows that the accountability mechanisms established for intelligence under
the EU umbrella suffer from major structural flaws. The European Parliament
lacks an independent oversight body, and the Council has no obligation to
inform the EP on intelligence matters. Wetzling therefore concludes that
structures for intelligence accountability are virtually absent at the European
level.
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Hold the executive accountable
A defining characteristic of the EU is the delegation of powerful executive
competencies to the European Commission, the European Central Bank
(ECB), and independent agencies. According to the fourth argument, the
arrangements that obtain at present are – even in the absence of strong
mechanisms for accountability – generally acceptable. The institutions that
exercise executive powers in the EU have been established through democratic
procedures; their decision-making methods are reasonably transparent; they
are subject to oversight by the European Parliament and the member states;
and the authority delegated to them can be revoked by amending the treaties
(Majone 1996b, 1998; Issing 1999).
In Chapter 9, ‘Executive power and accountability in the European Union’,
Jonas Tallberg examines these claims. He asks what powers have been dele-
gated and why, and to what extent the resulting pattern of delegation and
control presents a problem for accountability. He concludes that executive
power in the EU is subject to a variegated pattern of control and account-
ability. While the Commission and the European regulatory agencies operate
within relatively tight constraints, the ECB enjoys far-reaching discretion in
the exercise of its powers. The current state of affairs, Tallberg points out, is
one which proponents of strong accountability mechanisms find most unsat-
isfactory. The EP’s oversight of the Commission, the transparency policy of
the ECB, the statutes governing the European agencies, and the general threat
of treaty revision all serve to create an illusion of accountability; whereas, in
practice, these institutions only can be held accountable for their actions and
decisions with great difficulty, if at all.
In Chapter 10, ‘The European Central Bank – independent and accoun-
table?’, Daniel Naurin puts his full focus on the ECB. He wonders whether it
can reconcile the independence it requires to act credibly with the account-
ability it needs to be legitimate. He examines the claim that independence and
accountability are ‘two sides of the same coin’, as well as the argument that
the ECB is indeed subject to a sufficient level of democratic accountability.
Naurin finds that the latter claim is founded on the unsustainable assumption
that transparency – and in particular the ECB’s version of it – is a sufficient
condition for accountability. However, holding press conferences can never
be an adequate substitute for ensuing that the people are able to sanction
decision-makers.
Accountability through civil society
The fifth argument directs our interest towards civil society and organised
interests, which are increasingly regarded as alternative channels for citizen
participation and accountability at the EU level (Greenwood 2007; Steffek et
al. 2008). Letting civil society and organised interests take an active part in
policy-making is considered by both academic scholars and practitioners to
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offer a promising complement to representative democracy. According to this
argument, the involvement of organised civil society can increase transpar-
ency in the EU and put policy-making under public scrutiny and control, thus
facilitating accountability.
In Chapter 11, ‘Civil society participation and accountability’, Thomas
Persson notes that participatory and deliberative arrangements are increas-
ingly seen as having the potential to improve accountability in the EU. He
sets out to assess this potential on the basis of empirical findings from a
policy-making process in which new measures for societal involvement have
been tested: the overhaul of European chemicals policy. The results show that
this process was indeed, at least to some extent, more transparent, inclusive,
and responsive than EU-level decision-making in general. And transparency,
inclusiveness, and responsiveness are all prerequisites for accountability.
Accountability itself, however, must be furnished primarily by the traditional
representative bodies of the Union. While weak mechanisms of accountability
were improved in this case, stronger mechanisms were not changed in any way.
Persson therefore concludes that, despite great expectations that participatory
and deliberative measures would improve EU accountability, the evidence
from the chemicals-policy overhaul gives reason for caution.
In Chapter 12, ‘Improving accountability in the European Union: the poten-
tial role of NGOs’, Louisa Parks considers the role that non-governmental
organisations can play in securing effective accountability in the Union. Her
point of departure is that NGOs can contribute to weak forms of account-
ability, by monitoring the behaviour of EU institutions and calling attention
to any wrongdoing. However, these forms of accountability presume that the
quality of information-provision among the involved parties is high. Evidence
from interviews with representatives of NGOs involved in four EU-level
campaigns reveals that, in the eyes of these actors, the main problems have to
do with transparency and access in the case of the Commission, with secre-
tiveness in the case of the Council, and with lack of power in the case of an
otherwise exemplary European Parliament. Parks accordingly concludes that,
if we wish to see NGOs make their contribution to solving the EU’s
accountability problem, we will need to introduce greater transparency and
openness – particularly in the Council and the Commission.
In Chapter 13, finally, the editors make a plea for ‘Taking accountability
seriously’, stressing the importance of ‘telling it like it is’, acknowledging that
the current institutional set-up in the Union merely portrays an illusion of
accountability. Breaking up this illusion will allow us to see the more deep-
seated underlying problem, namely the absence of opposition in the EU. Only
by restoring opposition can we hope to establish real opportunities for EU
citizens to hold their representatives to account.
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